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Abstract 
Creative Accounting in Eastern Europe: 
the Case of the Polish Port Companies 
Dariusz Bernacki* and Carl Reyns** 
During 1991, a large number of small companies was created to run the operational 
activity of the Polish seaports, which was until then monopolised by state-owned enter-
prises. The major part of the shares is held by the employees. 
Leasing-techniques are used to solve the problem of financing the infrastructure. 
Although the profit-margins are relatively modest, the return on total assets is rather 
important because the infrastructure does not appear on the assets-side of the privatised 
companies. As a consequence of what we call leasing-leverage, the return on equity 
reaches almost astronomic heights. 
In the conclusion we indicate the potential dangers of this situation; the financial 
construction does not solve the ownership-problem of the assets, can lead to only very 
short-term based decisions and does not guarantee continuity when the assets have to be 
replaced. 
1. Introduction 
As a result of the transition and the privatisation process that is going on, 
Eastern Europe is being confronted with huge problems, one of which is getting 
the infrastructure needed by companies, being financed in one way or another. 
The «solution» in some cases was found by using leasing techniques, just as it is 
done e.g. by a lot of Western airline companies. In this context we will describe 
the «Polish Seaports Case». It will be demonstrated that, although at first glance 
the results seem to be satisfactory, the resulting behavior might be destructive to 
the economic health of the ports. 
During the period of centralized economy, the Polish seaports 
Szcecin/Swinoujscie, Gdansk and Gdynia were each dominated by a state-owned 
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enterprise, which in 1991 were restructured into state treasury joint stock com-
panies. 
The importance of these state-owned enterprises can be observed by the 
following facts. In Szcecin/Swinoujscie Port, the state-owned enterprise took 
care of 81 % of the 18 million tons that the port handled in 1990. In Gdansk Port 
99.8% or almost all of the 10 million tons of throughput. Each company em-
ployed between 5,000 and 6,000 people. 
A legal basis to transform and de-monopolize Polish port operation spheres 
was created by the Privatization Act of July 13, 1990.The indirect way of privati-
zation by first transforming the state-owned enterprise into a company with 
100% shares owned by the State Treasury and then making the shares accessible 
to third parties did not succeed: 
II The attractiveness to shareholders (natural and legal persons) guided by 
expected dividends was low because of inclusion of the infrastructure, huge 
in value but with low profitability. 
II As a result of this, firms within the maritime sector would have to purchase 
a control stock package" the cost of which was too huge, to fulfill their in-
vestment goals. 
II The inclusion of the suprastructure also increases goal achievement costs to 
public investors like towns and communities. 
2. Creation of operating companies 
In mid 1991 limited companies arose: 17 in Szcecin/Swinoujscie Port in-
cluding 8 cargo-handling/storage ones (and 9 building/repair companies) and 28 
in Gdansk, 8 of which were in the cargo-handling and storage activities.1 
The main characteristics in the functioning of the operating companies are 
as follows: 
II Financial structure of the (small) basic capital: 45% to the joint stock com-
pany, 55% to the port employees. 
1& The operating companies lease the infrastructure (wharf, storage areas, 
warehouses, etc.) and the suprastructure (cargo-handling facilities and 
equipment) from the joint stock company. The operating companies main-
tain and repair the leased elements at their own stocks, while the joint stock 
companies calculate the depreciation. Of course this is being reflected in 
The further elements in the case only refer to the 16 cargo-handling/storage compa-
nies. In Gdynia Port, the transformation is still in the initial stage. 
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the income structure of the joint stock companies. In the pre-
transformation period, 95% of their income has an operational character, 
now about 60% of their income is generated by leasing fees. 
ill The operating companies had to provide certainty of employment for aU 
former state-owned enterprise operational workers who are simultaneously 
the main owners and the employees of the firms. 
3. Performance of joint stock operating companies 
The performance can be measured: 
1) in relation to the revenues (see 3.1), where 
. EBDIT 2 Gross Margm = ---
SALES 
EADBIT 3 Net Margin = ---
SALES 
The margins express what is left from every 100 zloty of revenues, the dif-
ference between gross and net margin of course being due to depreciation. 
2) in relation to total assets (see 3.2), where 
Return on total assets = __ E_A_D_B_I_T_ 
TOTAL ASSETS 
This ratio is a measure of how efficient the available resources are being 
used. 
3) in relation to equity (see 3.3), where 
Return on equity = EADIBT 4 
EQillTY 
This ratio is a measure of the return generated for the owners of the com-
pany after the creditors (by means of interest) and the government (by means of 
taxes) have been rewarded, and after depreciation has been into consideration. 
EBDIT = Earnings before depreciation, interest and tax. 
EADBIT = Earnings after depreciation, before interest and tax. 
EADIBT = Earnings after depreciation, interest and before tax. 
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3.1. Gross and net margin 
As can be observed from table 1, we notice that as far as profitability meas-
ured by the gross and net margin is concerned, the performance of the operating 
companies is relatively low, certainly in comparison with the joint stock compa-
nies. Needless to say that a comparison of the two kinds of companie~ is not 
sensible in view of the totally different activities. The small difference between 
gross and net margin for the operating companies is due to the fact that they 
lease their main fixed assets while the depreciation is being reflected in the ac-
counts of the lessors (the joint stock companies) where of course the difference 
gross and net margin is much more important. 
Table 1 
Gross and net margins (in %) 
Gross Net Gross Net 
Margin Margin Margin Margin 
----+---------~--------~------~ 
Joint stock company 
Gdansk 
Operating companies 
Gdansk 
45,5 25,9 46,2 
7,3 
........................................................ ······1·····························,················· ......... + ............. . 
Joint stock company 
Szczecin/ Swinoujscie 
Operating compauies 
Szczecin/ Swinoujscie 
53,5 
Source: Own accounts based on port statistics. 
3.2. Return on total asset5 
37,3 68,7 
8,6 
26,3 
6,9 
43,3 
7,9 
As can be observed from table 2, the results here suggest a more favourable 
situation of the operating companies. This is, of course, due to the fact that total 
assets, expressed in the balance sheet of the operating companies, are artificially 
low because of the enormous use of leasing. 
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Table 2 
Return on total assets (in %) 
1992 
Joint stock company Gdansk 8,4 8,3 
Operating companies Gdansk 24,2 
" ................................ , .. H ••••• u ••• "" •• H •••••••••••••••••••• ,. ................. 'H •••• n ................................................................. . 
Joint stock company Szczecin/ Swinoujfcie 17,8 12,6 
Operating companies Szczecin/ Swinoujfcie 34,2 
Source: Own accounts based on port statistics. 
(Net) margins (as studied in 3.1) and return on total assets (as studied in 3.2) 
can be linked together by using the rotation (=sales/total assets) which suggests 
how many times every zloty invested in the resources is being converted into 
revenues in the «production» process. 
Return on Total Assets 
= (net) margin x rotation 
= 
EADBIT 
TotalAssets 
EADBIT Sales 
---x----= 
Sales TotalAssets 
As can be observed from table 3, the rotation of total assets is of course 
much larger in the operating companies. 
Table 3 
Rotation as the link between net margin and return on assets 
1991 1992 1992 1991 1992 1992 
Net margin 25,9 26,3 6,9 37,3 43,4 7,9 
.....•..................................... , ...... , ., ...... , .. " .................................................... " ............................... . 
Rotation xO,32 xO,32 x3,5 xO,48 xO,29 x4,3 
............................................... , ........... , ... , ............................. , ........... , .... , ............... + .................... . 
Return on assets 8,4 : 8,3 24,2 7,8 
(1) Joint stock company Gdansk 
(2) Operating companies Gdansk 
(3) Joint stock company SzczeciniSwinoujscie 
(4) Operating companies SzczeciniSwinoujscie 
12,6 34,2 
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3.3. Return on equity 
Here, as was the case with return on assets, the figures seem in favour of the 
operating companies, but this time the differences are gigantic. This, of course, 
is due to the fact that besides a relatively low amount of total assets, only a small 
fraction is being financed by owner's equity, while no interest has to be paid on 
the debt. 
Again we want to stress the fact that making comparisons between the oper-
ating and the joint stock companies is not very sensible. 
Table 4 
Return on equity (in %) 
Joint stock company Gdansk 
Operating companies Gdansk 
Joint stock company Szczecinl Swinoujfcie 
Operating companies Szczecinl Swinoujfcie 
Source: Own accounts. 
1991 1992 
9,5 
19,9 
8,6 
220 
14,3 
273,6 
It is clear that the well-known leverage effect is at work here. In view of the 
circumstances we will call it «leasing-leverage» in this context and elaborate 
more on this effect in the following paragraph. 
4. Leasing-leverage 
Leasing-leverage has aspects of two other, better-known concepts in finan-
cial analysis, i.e. financial and operational leverage. 
Operational leverage results from using assets partly resulting in fixed opera-
tional costs although the revenue generated is variable. 
Financial leverage results from using financial resources which generate 
profits beyond the fixed rate you have to pay for them. The financial leverage 
effect can be measured by (return on equity/return on assets). 
The magnitude of the financial leverage effect is the result of a combination 
of three elements: return on total assets, interest and the debt/equity ratio, as 
can be seen from the following formula: 
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Return on Equity = Return on Assets + (Return on Assets - Interest %) x 
x Debt/Equity 
or from the graphical presentation of our hypothetical example. In this example 
we start from a 50% Debt/50% Equity situation, the return on assets equals 15% 
and the interest rate is 10%. 
Graph 1 
20% 
Return on Equity 
Equity 50% Debt 50% 
15% 
Return on assets 
I 0% Interest 
a) In this example, return on total assets equals 15%. It is clear that return on 
equity reaches 20% because the 5% extra on top of the interest which has to 
be paid because of the debt returns to the owners on top of what equity al-
ready earned for them. Of course this is only true because in this case equity 
equals debt. 
b) If, everything else remaining the same, the interest goes down to 5%, return 
on equity will again increase to 25%. 
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c) If, everything else remaining the same, the debt/equity ratio climbs to 1.5 
(equity being 40%, debt 60%), it is easy to see that return on equity increases 
to 22.5%. 
d) If we assume that the three changes described in a, band c occur simultane-
ously, return on equity boosts to 42.5%. 
The graphical presentation for the operating companies in Gdansk results in 
(see graph 2): 
220% 
Return on Equity 
Equity 11% 
Graph 2 
Debt 89% 
Return on assets 
24,2% 
0% Interest 
Return on Equity = Return on Assets + (Return on Assets - Interest %) x 
x DebtlEquity 
220% = 24.2% + (24.2% - 0) x 89111 
Creative Accounting in Eastern Europe 
--~-----------------
57 
For the operating companies in Szczecin/Swinoujsc:ie we get graph 3. 
Graph 3 
273,6 % 
Return on Equity 
Equity 12,5 % Debt 87,5 % 
Return on assets 
34,2% 
0% Interest 
Return on Equity = Return on Assets + (Return on Assets - Interest %) x 
x DebtlEquity 
273.6% = 34.2% + (34.2% - 0) x 87.5112 
The return figures we get here are very impressive. The three elements we 
mentioned earlier to get a high return on equity are working together. First, an 
interest rate which equals O. In fact the companies are paying interest, but this is 
being reflected in the leasing fees they are paying to the lessons, the joint stock 
companies, which in turn explains the very moderate profit margins. However, 
In Bclg Jil, .:.g., where the accounting regulations stipulate that the lessee puts the 
leased assets on his balance sheet, you would get completely different results ... unless 
the conditions described in the law to fall under this arrangement are not met. 
_5_8 _________ C_re_a_th_'e_""_k_c_ou!!'ting in Eastern Europe 
because of the very high rotation, due to the fact that the main fixed assets do 
not appear in their balance sheets, they get seemingly high return on assets lev-
els. The same explanation goes for the debt/equity ratio. 
The magnitude of this leverage effect is once more very clear when we look 
at the figures of table 5, where we learn that 98% of the assets at the disposal of 
the operating companies is being leased. 
Table 5 
Assets at disposal (own + leased) of operating companies (1992) 
TOTAL 
of which 
Leased assets 
Own assets of 
operating companies 
Port of Szczf;lciniSwinonjscie 
.000 min zloty 
1,05.7 100 
1,035.0 98,0 
22,1 2,0 
PortQ:l' Qda.nsk 
000 m~)l()ty % 
?44,4 100 
921,6 97,6 
Source: D. BERNACKI en J. GORA, Privatisation in Polish Seaports, Paper pre-
sented at Workshop-UFSIA, 1993. 
5. Conclusions 
Although the accounting figures seem to suggest that things are working out 
all right, we ought to mention some warnings. 
It The problem we encounter here is a very complex one: there is a big contrast 
between the week economical basis of activity and financial position of the 
operating companies on one hand, and the high profitability of the capital 
put at the disposal of companies by their partners: the joint stock companies 
together with the companies' employees. 
It The large disproportions between the engaged capital and the assets in use 
allow shareholders to: 
• maximise profits from own shares by operation of leased assets; 
• limit the responsibility to a maximum. 
" At first glance everybody feels happy and this leads to consolidate the be-
haviour aimed towards maximised profits (from shares and remuneration). 
This conduct, however, might be destructive to the operating companies' 
development and competitiveness and to the whole port as such. 
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• The high return on equity from the operating companies is being caused by 
leasing fees which are in fact too low. 
e Even the joint stock companies can make a big margin due to the fact that 
depreciation is not enough to cover the real cost of using the fixed assets.6 
@ The well-being of the operating companies is very dependent on the lease 
agreements and any change could lead to a completely different outlook. 
The way in which the construction is being built does not solve the asset-
ownership problem, could lead to very short-term based decisions and does 
not guarantee sound economic behavior by the parties involved. 
41 Consolidated information would only offer a partial solution because, in 
view of the fact that the joint stock company only holds 45% of the shares of 
the operating companies, only the equity method-or «one-line consolida-
tion»-which can hardly be considered a superior method, enters into the 
picture. 
41 Of course these conclusions are only preliminary since, due to the only very 
recent changes, no intertemporal comparisons can be made. In the mean-
time we can only hope that the resources required to replace the fixed assets 
in the long run will not be distributed ... 
Samenvatting 
Q~bruikvan leasingteehniekerz doorfoolse zeeftgyj!l}LS 
In de loop van 1991 kwam de operationele aetiviteit van de Poolse zeehavens, 
voorheen gemonopoliseerd door staatsondernemingen, in handen van een groot aantal 
kleine ondernemingen met de werknemers als voornaamste aandeelhouders. Gezien de 
problemen verbonden aan de finaneiering van de infrastrueturuur, werd gebruik 
gemaakt van leasingteehnieken. Deze infrastruetuur verschijnt niet op de aetivazijde van 
de geprivatiseerde ondetnemingen. Zulks heeft tot gevolg dat, ondanks relatief 
beseheiden marges, de rendabiliteit van hef totale aetief Vlij aanzienlijk is. Tengevolge 
van wat wij in hef artikel de leasighefdoom noemen, bereikt de rendabiliteit van het 
eigen vermogen dan ook astronomisehe hoogten. 
In het besluit wordt gewezen op de potenti:le gevaren die daaraan verbonden zijn: de 
opgezette finaneie1e eonstuetie lost het eigendomprosbeem van de aetiva niet op, kan 
feiden tot op sleehts zeer korte termijn gebaseerde beslissingen en garandeert geen 
eontinuoteit op het vervangingsmoment. 
It is worth mentioning that depreciation policy in the past has always been treated as 
an arm to combat inflation rather than as an instrument to calculate the value of the 
usage of the fixed asset to determine the real cost of the production process. 

